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1 Introduction 
On 30
th
 April 2016 the provisions of the new Regulation on Open Internet Access
1
 will enter 
into force in the EU. This will be yet another chapter of the long debate –some would call it 
saga- on net neutrality and the desirable architecture of the internet.  
It is undeniable that the internet has become in a very short time a fundamental element of 
most people’s professional and personal lives. High speed access to the net is now 
considered as an indispensable tool for innovation, productivity and development in modern 
societies. What is more, the internet has proven during the last decade that it is a potentially 
limitless technology whose disruptive effects can alter almost every industry, even its own 
one.  
The internet has also become an essential tool for our private life. More and more citizens 
exercise their rights of freedom of expression and information on the internet, and digital 
newspapers and news-agencies are quickly replacing analogical ones as the main forum for 
debate and knowledge exchange. The increasing role that the internet plays in our societies is 
also reflected in the political arena, where most political parties are starting to take a position 
on how the internet should be regulated. As Commissioner Kroes expressed in a speech to 
the European Parliament:  
“I want us to show citizens that the EU is relevant to their lives. That we made the digital rules 
catch up with their legitimate expectations (…) I want you to be able to say that you saved 
their right to access the open internet, by guaranteeing net neutrality.”
2
 
However, the internet is also subject to significant technological constraints. One of the most 
important relates to the maximum capacity of cables and their ability to carry an ever 
increasing amount of data while avoiding congestion issues.
3
 As a result of recent 
technological changes, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are now able to exercise a greater 
control on the data packets that flow through their networks.
4
 This control allows them to be 
able to discriminate between the different content and applications, thus opening the 
possibility to tap new sources of revenues by charging content providers for “priority rights”.
5
  
As it could be expected, content providers do not agree with this new design of the internet 
and are fighting to maintain a non-discriminatory approach to data traffic. But they are not the 
only ones who oppose moving away from the “best-effort” guided practice that was conceived 
in the original structure of the internet
6
 to a differentiation of quality of service (QoS) that 
would allow discriminatory pricing practices.
7
  Several abuses of fundamental rights by ISPs 
have alarmed significant sectors of society, who believe that by granting ISPs absolute control 
on the data that goes through the cables they will lose control over what, when or how they 
can access content on the internet. 
As a result of mixing these economic and political concerns, a lively debate has been sparked 
                                                          
1
 Regulation 2015/2120 of November 25 2015 laying down measures concerning open internet access 
and amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic 
communications networks and services and Regulation No 531/2012 on roaming on public mobile 
communications networks within the Union, OJ L 310, 26.11.2015, p. 1–18 
2
 N. KROES, “The politics of the completing the Telecoms Single Market”, Speech/13/484 30 May 2013, 
available at : http://europ.eu/rapid/press-realease_SPEECH-13-484_fr.htm 
3
 A PISANTY, “Network Neutrality Debates in Telecommunications Reform: Actors, Incentives, Risks” in in 
L. BELLI,  P. DE FILIPPI, Net Neutrality Compendium: Human Rights, Free Competition and the Future of 
the Internet”, Springer, London, 2016, p.127, at 129 
4
 L.DE MUYTER, Y. DESMEDT, “Net Neutrality-from Catch-all to Catch-22” (2012) in A. STROWEL,  Net 
Neutrality in Europe/ La neutralité de l’InternetInternet en Europe, Bruylant, Brussels, 2013, p.57 
5
 B. VAN SCHEWICK. “Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Non-Discrimination Rule Should 
Look Like” (2015) 67,1. Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Research Paper No. 
2459568. Stanford Law Review, p. 3 
6
 B. VAN SCHEWICK, D FARBER, “Network Neutrality Nuances”. (2009) 52, 2, Communications of the ACM. 
p.31 
7
 P. LAROUCHE , “Five Neglected issues about network neutrality” in A. STROWEL,  Net Neutrality in 
Europe/ La neutralité de l’Internet en Europe, Bruylant, Brussels, 2013, p.77, at 79 
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during the last decade. During this time, both sides of the dispute have advanced legitimate 
arguments and, so far, governments and regulatory agencies have only been able to offer 
partially satisfactory measures. The question on whether the architecture of the internet 
should resemble a “dumb pipe”
8
 that merely connects content providers with end users or a 
“smart cable” network able to discriminate between different content and operate in a two 
sided market
9
 is still up to debate. 
The first part of this paper contextualises the debate on net neutrality, analysing the different 
definitions of the term, the different actors in the market and their motivations. The second 
section is focused on the analysis of the need for regulation and the way the market works, 
paying particular attention to the underlying economic motivations of the different actors and 
the choice between different legislative and regulatory instruments. 
To conclude, the main provisions of Regulation 2015/2120 will be analysed according to the 
principles laid down in the previous sections. Based also on these ideas, some elements for 
improvement will be highlighted and the role of competition law in an alternative and more 
flexible framework will be analysed. 
                                                          
8
 J. SLUIJS, “Network Neutrality and European Law” [2012]. Network Neutrality and European law 
Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers (WLP). p.33. 
9
 N. ECONOMIDES, “Net Neutrality Non-Discrimination and Digital Distribution of Content through the 
Internet” (2008) 4:1. I/S: Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society, p.1-26 
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2 The net neutrality debate: what is it about? 
The net neutrality debate has been, without a doubt, one of the most active regulatory 
debates of the decade.
10
 Almost all internet giants have at some point, expressed their 
position on the debate and, with an increasing role of politics in the area, it is not uncommon 
to find net neutrality related news in the mass media. Even President Obama made of net 
neutrality one of its major proposals during his first presidential campaign
11
. To contextualise 
the reach of the debate, this section will analyse the different definitions given to the term, 
their implications and the different actors involved in the market.  
2.1 What is net neutrality? 
After more than one decade, scholars still struggle to give a clear definition to “net 
neutrality”.
12
 The difficulty to clearly demarcate this issue is caused not only by the fact that 
the concept has not yet been unanimously defined by the industry or academics but also by 
the fact that it spans over very broad concepts -such as liberty, social fairness and non-
discrimination.
13
  
In its academic sense, the term “net neutrality” was first introduced at the beginning of the 
new millennium in a paper titled “Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination”.
14
 In its most 
basic definition “net neutrality” refers to the prohibition for Internet Service Providers or 
Internet Access Providers (ISPs or IAPs) to discriminate or treat in a different way the 
requests of different end-users.
15
 As such, net neutrality refers to the idea of keeping an 
“open and neutral” access to the Internet for actors upstream (content providers) and 
downstream (end-users),
 16
 and to avoid any discriminatory or blocking practices by ISPS.
17 
 
Nonetheless, the definitions given to net neutrality vary greatly between different authors 
depending on the nationality, role and motivations of the writer. Some scholars prefer to avoid 
technical matters in their definitions and keep the reach of the term as broad as possible, thus 
making the definition easier to relate to consumer’s rights, fundamental freedoms and even 
data protection. This is the case for leading scholars such as William Baumol, who defines net 
neutrality as a set of proposals whose aim is to prevent ISPs from “charging more for priority 
delivery” 
18
, or Barbara Van Schewick which refers to net neutrality as a set of “non-
discriminatory rules that prevent operators to discriminate against third parties”
19
. This broad 
approach has also been endorsed by the European Union in its regulation Regulation 
2015/2120, where net neutrality is referred to as the “safeguard of equal and non-
discriminatory treatment of traffic in the provision of internet access services and related end-
                                                          
10
 R. QUECK, “La Neutralité de l’internet, la gestion du traffic et les services gérés ” in A. STROWEL,  Net 
Neutrality in Europe/ La neutralité de l’Internet en Europe, Bruylant, Brussels, 2013, p.111, at 111  
11
 R. LAYTON “Test of the FCC’s Virtuous Circle: preliminary Results for Edge Provider innovation and 
BIAS Provider Investment by Country with Hard versus Soft Rules” in L. Belli,  P. de Filippi, Net 
Neutrality Compendium: Human Rights, Free Competition and the Future of the Internet”, Springer, 
London, 2016, p.171, at 190 
12
 M. CAVE , P. CROCIONI, “Does Europe Need Network Neutrality Rules?” (2007) 1, International Journal 
of Communication, p.670  
13
 M. CAVE , P. CROCIONI,  supra note 12, p.670 
14
 T. WU, “Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination”(2003) 2, Journal of Telecommunications and 
High Technology Law, pp. 141-179 
15
 BEREC, “Differentiation practices and related competition issues in the scope of net neutrality”, 
(2012) 12 31 BoR, p 4. 
 
16
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and 
social committee and the Committee of the Regions on “The open internet and net neutrality in Europe” 
COM (2011) 222 final, (19.04.2011) 
17
 C. MARSDEN, “Zero Rating and Mobile Net Neutrality” in L. BELLI,  P. DE FILIPPI, Net Neutrality 
Compendium: Human Rights, Free Competition and the Future of the Internet”, Springer, London, 2016, 
p.241, at 243 
18
 W.J. BAUMOL, ET AL, “Economists’statement on net neutrality, [2007], AEI Brookings joint center for 
regulatory studies.
 
19
 B.  VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 5, p.329 
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users rights”.
20
 
The flexibility of the definition of net neutrality is clearly shown by the ambiguous position of 
some of the most important companies of the sector.
21
 In 2010, Google reached an important 
agreement with Verizon (an American telecom operator) and consequently considerably 
changed its position regarding net neutrality. Shortly after the agreement was signed, Eric 
Schmidt -former CEO of Google- quickly specified that Google fully supported net neutrality 
but restricted its definition to non-discrimination between data of the same type instead of 
discrimination of all data.
22
 Consequently, according to this non-strict definition of net 
neutrality, discrimination within services “such as video and voice”
23
 would be perfectly 
possible. 
However, it is not uncommon to find more detailed and technical definitions. These definitions 
usually do not focus on the impact of net neutrality in society but on the requirements needed 
to ascertain whether a network is neutral or not. A great example of this approach is given by 
Alejandro Pisanty, who defines neutrality of a network as the delivery of Internet Protocol (IP) 
by “without discrimination in its five essential elements
24
: protocols used, ports of connection, 
contents requested or point of origin and destination”.
25
 As a result of this approach, the term 
net neutrality is detached from its more political meanings and merely focuses on the 
description of a practice in the telecommunications market. 
 Another great example of a technical definition was elaborated by BEREC, who in turn 
received its input from the Norwegian Communications Authority (NKOM).
26
 This definition 
emphasises that “all electronic communication passing through a network must be treated 
equally. That all communication is treated equally means that it is treated independent of (i) 
content, (ii) application, (iii) service, (iv) device, (v) sender address, and (vi) receiver 
address”
27
. As such, the term “net neutrality” refers to an absolute ban on four kinds of 
activities: content blocking (blocking access to different sites and services on the internet), 
prioritization of a company’s own services (which is particularly relevant in vertically integrated 
undertakings), voluntary service degradation or bandwidth throttling practises (intentional 
slowing of certain internet services or applications).
28
 
2.2 Actors in the market 
As in any other regulated market, the debate over net neutrality is heavily influenced by the 
actors that operate in it. In order to understand their different positions it is necessary to 
discern their different motivations and to identify the conflicting points. Although there are 
many different ways to classify them, in this section they will be divided according to their 
primary function between: owners of the infrastructure (ISPs or network operators), content 
providers and end users.
29
 
2.2.1 Network Operators/ Internet Service Providers: 
ISP(s) manage the infrastructure necessary for connecting the source of the data (e.g. a 
content provider) to end-users. The requirements of these two extremes of the network define 
the standards that net operators have to satisfy, as they need to fulfil the expectations and 
demands of both ends of the pipe.  
                                                          
20
 Regulation 2015/2120 of November 25 2015, supra note 1, p.1 
21
 A. STROWEL, “Net Neutrality: What Regulation For the Internet In Europe and Beyond” in A. STROWEL,  
Net Neutrality in Europe/ La neutralité de l’Internet en Europe, Bruylant, Brussels, 2013, p.1, at 6 
22
 Emphasis added 
23
 Interview of  E. Schmidt quoted in D. GOLDMAN, “Why Google and Verizon’s neutrality deal affects 
you”, CNN Money, 5 August 2010. 
24
 Also referred as the “five alls” 
25
 A PISANTY, supra note 3,p. 129 
26
 F. SORENSEN, “Specialised Services and the Net Neutrality Service Model” in L. BELLI,  P. DE FILIPPI, 
Net Neutrality Compendium: Human Rights, Free Competition and the Future of the Internet”, Springer, 
London, 2016, p.99, at 100 
27
 BEREC, supra note 15, p 4. 
28
 L. DE MUYTER, Y. DESMEDT, supra note 4, pp. 47-48 
29
N. ECONOMIDES, supra note, p.4 
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This is far from an easy task as each of the activities of end users may result in very different 
kinds of demand, which includes different data transit requirements, bandwidth use and 
stability needs.
30
 To satisfy these requirements net operators need to monitor the traffic on 
their networks. Since congestion will result in random packets being dropped from the net, 
31
 
the quality of service will be degraded for all users. However, since revenue to ISPs is 
provided by the end-users, it is in their interest to ensure the quality of the service remains 
acceptable for most of them.
32
 Striking a good balance becomes even more complex for ISPs 
when the fact that packets need to go through different net operators before arriving to the 
end users is taken into consideration.   
It is also important to realise that network operators and ISPs are terms that, although they 
design undertakings in the same side of the market, are not exactly the same thing. ISPs are 
divided in different tiers depending on the number of networks they control and their 
extension. A network operator is an ISP in the lower tiers (last mile connection), usually 
providing service to a limited geographic area and relying on higher tiers to connect to other 
networks.
33
 
2.2.2 End Users: 
The most important characteristic of end users is found in its sheer numbers and huge 
diversity. To most of them the way the network works is irrelevant; they pay their ISPs (and 
some even pay to specific content providers) to have access to a number of services. In 
exchange for this payment, they expect -as any other consumer- a service whose quality will 
enable them to enjoy the services they have acquired. However, when the network becomes 
congested some or all end users will experience degraded quality of service. In many cases, 
their lack of expertise about how the system works makes them prone to side against the net 
operator, which in many countries have a reputation for being ineffective or to favour certain 
clients
34
. What is more, their ability to “vote with their feet” on bad traffic management 
practices from their ISPs is often hindered by the lack of alternatives or the difficulty to switch 
between providers.
35
   
2.2.3 Content Providers: 
If network operators are characterised for their relatively low numbers, online service 
providers (or OSPs) are potentially almost infinite. This diversity is not restricted to their 
numbers, since the services that they provide are also extremely different and require 
different data intensities. This high variety is not a problem as long as the combined flow of 
data is lower than the capacity of the network. However, if the opposite problem arises, the 
capacity of the network will be exhausted and delays of loss of data will happen
36
. Although 
there are different strategies to mitigate the damage caused by network overload (such as 
data compression or buffering) each content provider and service delivered has different 
requirements and such strategies may be very damaging to their products
37
.  
The most relevant element regarding the debate over net neutrality is the relation between 
content providers and net operators. Since massive data transfers issued by content 
providers are likely to create congestion in some parts of the network, most of the debate 
focuses on who should bear the costs of increasing the capacity of the network.  Content 
providers rely on ISPs’ investment and management of the network to reach end consumers. 
                                                          
30
 A PISANTY, supra note 3, p. 129 
31
 P. LAROUCHE, supra note 7, p.78 
32
 L. POUZIN, “Net Neutrality and Quality of Service” in L. BELLI,  P. DE FILIPPI, Net Neutrality 
Compendium: Human Rights, Free Competition and the Future of the Internet”, Springer, London, 2016, 
p.73, at 76. 
33
 A PISANTY, supra note 3, p. 129 
34
 B. THORNGREN, “Net Neutrality; not as neutral as it sounds” (2006), 1, Ericsson Business Review, 
pp.35-39 
35
 P. LAROUCHE, supra note 15, p.81 
36
 P. LAROUCHE, supra note 15, p.78 
37
 L. POUZIN, supra note 30, p. 75 
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Since most content providers are heavily dependent on network effects
38
, it is in their interest 
that net operators invest as much as possible in “last mile” connections. However, net 
operators are well aware of their strategic role and try to make content providers participate in 
their investment.
39
 
2.3 The two sides of the debate: 
Now that the different actors in the market have been identified, it is possible to frame the 
different views over net neutrality. As in many other regulatory debates, the views over net 
neutrality are divided between proponents and opponents with very little common ground 
between these two perceptions.
40
 
Opponents of net neutrality are usually led by ISPs, and although they are less vocal than 
their opponents, it is not uncommon to find some scholars and regulators on this side of the 
debate.
41
 From their point of view, the need for price discrimination is a direct consequence of 
the higher prices they have to face to deliver higher volumes of content at higher speeds.
42
 It 
is also common to find arguments on this side of the debate relating to protection of 
investments and promoting innovation.
43
 According to this approach, price discrimination is 
positive for society as it would help ISPs to finance the huge costs of developing the 
infrastructure necessary for the connections’ next generation.
44
  
As it can easily be inferred, the position against net neutrality is mostly based on economic 
factors. In many ways, the position held by most ISPs is the result of recent technological 
changes in the market and clearly reflects the concern of ISPs to find new business models.
45
 
In the longer term, ISPs fear becoming relegated to the role of a mere “data pipe” between 
content providers and end users.
46
 Under these circumstances ISPs would lose all their 
market power and would be left out of the most important decisions of the market. To prevent 
the “commoditization” of their services, ISPs try to turn their services into a two-sided market 
that would allow them to preserve some relevance.
47
 One of the best strategies to connect 
end users and content providers is precisely being able to offer discriminatory pricing and 
therefore, being able to adapt to different providers or end users demands and to compete 
between themselves. 
According to the original design of the internet, traffic management would be guided by a 
“best effort” service
48
. This means that all packets are treated equally and the network does 
its best to deliver them, without granting any guarantees regarding delay or packet losses. On 
the contrary, a network that offers QoS (quality of service) practices may prioritise between 
different packets
49
, and thus guarantee a certain delay or stability for a sum of money. This 
possibility can be particularly important –and valuable- for congestion-sensitive applications. 
                                                          
38
 J.CRÉMER, P. REY AND J. TIROLE, “Connectivity in the Commercial Internet” (2000) 48,4, The Journal of 
Industrial Economics, p.437 
39
 This has already led to some complaints in some Member States such as the dispute between 
Cogent and France Telecom over their peering agreements generated by Megaupload (Decision nº12-
D-18 of the French Competition Council of 20 September 2012) or KPN’s decision to start deep packet 
inspection and VoIP throttling in the Netherlands. 
40
 K. STYLIANOU, “The Persistent Problems of Net Neutrality or Why are We Still Lacking Stable Net 
Neutrality Regulation”in A. STROWEL,  Net Neutrality in Europe/ La neutralité de l’Internet en Europe, 
Bruylant, Brussels, 2013, pp.211, at 213 
41
 A. STROWEL, supra note 7, p.6 
42
 A. STROWEL, supra note 7, p.6 
43
 NET CONFIDENT COALITION, “Ensuring Network Stability and Consumer Confidence in Competitive 
Markets”, [2009], p.3 
44
 NET CONFIDENT COALITION, supra note, 43, p.3 
45
 R. FRIEDEN, “The debate over network neutrality in the United States” in A. STROWEL,  Net Neutrality in 
Europe/ La neutralité de l’Internet en Europe, Bruylant, Brussels, 2013, p.25, at 27  
46
 P. LAROUCHE, supra note 7, p.78 
47
 P. LAROUCHE supra note 7, p. 78 
48
 B. VAN SCHEWICK. Supra note 5, p. 3 
49
 J. KUROSE, K. ROSS, “Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach”. Boston, MA: Pearson:Addison 
Wesley, 2010, p.34 
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More importantly, the effects of the new technologies can already be felt in the market and 
they are forcing ISPs to look for new sources of revenue. Although the cannibalization of 
revenue from the fixed voice telephony services at the beginning of the decade was easily 
compensated by increasing revenues from the development of broadband internet access, 
the math does not look so clear regarding revenues from mobile lines.
50
 In this case the threat 
is much higher, since revenues from mobile telephony have traditionally been higher and, with 
the development of 3G and 4G, competition by applications is higher.
51
This shift in revenues 
could heavily affect the profitability of ISPs and, consequently, settling the debate in a 
satisfactory manner is an essential part of their future business strategy. 
If the position of net neutrality opponents is mainly driven by economic reasons, the reasons 
that drive net neutrality proponents are founded in elements of freedom, non-discrimination 
and consumer’s rights.
52
 Net neutrality supporters claim that ISPs already have the ability to 
discriminate between the content that goes through its network and, consequently, to block or 
favour certain kinds of contents.
53
 According to their point of view, the potential harm of such 
restrictions would not only be limited to competition between content providers and their 
freedom of choice
54
, but could also easily extend to matters relating freedom of expression or 
personal privacy.
55
  As a result of this broader approach, net neutrality proponents usually 
increase substantially the reach of their definition and include political elements in their 
analysis. In many cases this results in non-economic elements playing a fundamental role in 
the proposed regulation of the market.
56
 
 The potential harm of data and price discrimination is enhanced by the fact that very often 
end users do not have the possibility to choose between different ISPs. In many areas of the 
United States and the European Union, users only have access to one –potentially two- last 
mile internet access providers.
57
 As a result, many end users are not able to vote with their 
feet against any unnecessary service degradation and are defenceless against any kind of 
arbitrary discrimination. However, this threat is less significant for content providers as it is 
easier to shift between different internet backbone providers at the “entry side of the pipe”.
58
  
The banner of network neutrality has rallied many heterogeneous groups. Among them it is 
easy to find human rights organisations, consumer rights advocates and leading technological 
companies such as Microsoft or Yahoo!
59
 An important number of governments
60
 have shown 
their support to net neutrality until this date and so has, as expressed in Commissioner Kroes 
speech of June 4
th
 2013, the European Commission.
61
  
A closer analysis of the motivations of internet giants and end users shows the reasons 
behind this unlikely alliance. It is beyond any kind of doubt that it is in both groups’ interest 
that the service is delivered unconstrained by any throttling, blocking or any other element 
that may negatively affect its quality.
62
 End users want to enjoy the best quality for the service 
they have paid for and content providers want their services to arrive uninterrupted to their 
users without having to make additional payments to the ISPs. As the saying says, “Si Paris 
                                                          
50
 L. DE MUYTER, Y. DESMEDT, supra note 4.  p.55 
51
 L. DE MUYTER, Y. DESMEDT, supra note 4.  p.55 
52
 M. CAVE , P. CROCIONI, supra note 12, p.670. 
53
 R. FRIEDEN, supra note 45, p. 28 
54
 B. VAN SCHEWICK, D FARBER, supra note 6, p.31 
55
 L.BELLI, “End-to-End, Net Neutrality and Human Rights” in L. BELLI,  P. DE FILIPPI, Net Neutrality 
Compendium: Human Rights, Free Competition and the Future of the Internet”, Springer, London, 2016, 
p.16  
56
 M. CAVE , P. CROCIONI, supra note 12, p.670. 
57
 R. FRIEDEN, supra note  45, p.29 
58
 R. FRIEDEN, supra note 45, p. 29 
59
 A. STROWEL, supra note 21,p.6 
60
 An important number of countries have passed laws guaranteeing net neutrality. The Netherlands and 
Chile led the way, that was joined, among others, by the Colombia, Peru, Slovenia, the U.S, Brazil, 
Mexico and, more recently, the European Union. 
61
 N. KROES, supra note 2, p.4 
62
 A PISANTY, supra note  3, p.129 
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vaut bien une messe”,
63
 enjoying free-of-charge access to the network is certainly worth 
showing a strong position on fundamental rights matters for these internet giants.  
 Taking everything into account, it is easy to realise that net neutrality partisans are not only 
concerned about potentially higher prices for their internet connection. On the contrary net 
neutrality is for them the best tool to guarantee access to an open internet and that no 
company will be able to take control of the network.
64
  Contrary to the “laissez faire” approach 
defended by net neutrality opponents, partisans believe that market regulation and state 
intervention are positive for innovation and business opportunities.
65
  
Table 1: Definition of Net Neutrality and prevalent position 
Actor Position on Net Neutrality In Favour/ Opposing 
Telecom Operators Regulation is not necessary. Specific 
market rules are sufficient. 
Opposing 
Content Providers Regulation is essential to ensure fair 
competition. They want to avoid double 
payments to ISPs 
In Favour 
Technically aware users Conflicting views. Aware of pros and 
cons of “hard-core” net neutrality 
regulation 
In Favour/ Opposing 
Technically Unaware 
users 
Net Neutrality relates to democratic 
values and freedom of speech 
In Favour 
Source: R. WOJCIK
66
 and own elaboration. 
 
                                                          
63
 Quote attributed to Henry IV of France, a convinced protestant that decided to abandon his beliefs 
and convert to catholicism in order to be able to rule France. 
64
 R. WOJCIK, “Net Neutral Quality of service Differentiation in Flow-Aware Networks” (2011) AGH 
University of Science and Technology, Krakow, p. 37 
65
 A. STROWEL, supra note 21, p.5 
66
 R. WOJCIK, supra note 64, p.12 
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3 Net neutrality and the desired regulatory framework  
Both sides of the debate have extensively argued about the (numerous) benefits of their 
position and the (even more numerous) disadvantages of the proposals of the opposing side. 
Despite the polarisation of the debate, both sides have been able to put forward very sensible 
arguments from a legal, political and economic point of view. This section will try to review the 
most importants of them. 
3.1 The case for regulation: Competition law and fundamental rights infringements 
by ISPs 
The most important regulatory concern for net neutrality proponents is related to the ability of 
ISPs to block access to specific services and, by doing that, restrict consumer’s rights and 
thwart innovation on the internet.
67
 Although even net neutrality opponents recognise that this 
outcome is far from desirable, ISPs have proven that falling into this sort of anticompetitive 
behaviour can be too tempting to resist.
68
  
Two good examples of this kind of behaviour were displayed by Madison River and Comcast 
in 2005 and 2007 respectively. 
69
 Madison River, a phone company based in North Carolina, 
decided to block a telephony application called Vonage because it was perceived as a threat 
to its core business.
70
 Similarly, Comcast –which at the time of the infringement was the 
second largest ISP in the U.S. - shut down different peer-to-peer services
71
, including those of 
Vuze, a company that legally delivered television content
72
. As in the previous case, the fact 
that Vuze competed with part of Verizon’s core business seemed to be at the decision to 
block their services.
73
  
However, as some net neutrality proponents have underlined, the ability by ISPs to block 
specific content is not limited to competition-related issues.
74
 In 2007, AT&T deleted part of a 
statement issued by the grunge band Pearl Jam because their critics towards George W. 
Bush violated their content policies.
75
 Similar breaches of freedom of expression or 
consumer’s rights have been done by Verizon Wire (who blocked a message campaign by a 
pro-abortion group) or AOL, which blocked some critics to its new pay-to-send email 
scheme
76
. More recently, there have been allegations that Telefónica is slowing down 
connections to Netflix in Spain in order to protect their cable TV service.
77
   
Table 2: Brief selection of net neutrality breaches and harmed values 
ISP/ Content Provider Year Discrimination Harm to Competition 
/Fund. Rights 
Madison River/ 
Vonage 
2004 Service was blocked  Competition 
Telus/TWU 2005 Webpage was blocked Fundamental Rights 
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AOL/ Dearol 2006 Webpage was blocked Fundamental  Rights 
Verizon/ Naral (Pro-
abortion Association) 
2007 Service was blocked Competition & 
Fundamental Rights 
AT&T/ Pearl Jam 2007 Content of a statement was 
modified 
Fundamental Rights 
Comcast/ Bit Torrent 2008 Blocking of application Competition 
Free/Google 2013 Blocking of sponsored links Competition 
Source: R. WOJCIK
78
, B. FELTEN
79
 and own elaboration. 
Although all these cases cannot be considered by any means as a coordinated and far 
reaching strategy to put a competitor out of the market
80
 or to manipulate public opinion, they 
clearly show that ISPs have the ability to control the traffic that flows through their networks.
81
 
Consequently, it is safe to assert that, at least, there are some aspects highlighted by net 
neutrality partisans that should be taken into account when assessing the necessity of net 
neutrality regulation.
82
 
3.2 The indispensability of discriminatory practices for network managing 
Even if ISPs have proven that they have the ability to put in practice the extremely dangerous 
practices for society; their arguments against net neutrality should not have been 
automatically discarded by regulators.
83
 What it is more, most of the industry agrees that 
some kind of network management and control over its content is necessary.
84
 Even BEREC, 
the European body of regulators for Electronic Communications, acknowledges the 
usefulness and need for control and blocking practices under certain circumstances.
85
  Data 
packets screening plays an essential role in controlling spam, phishing and other harmful 
practices on the internet.
86
 Even law enforcement sometimes requires selective blocking of 
applications or websites (for instance in cases of child-abuse imagery or to prevent 
Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks).
87
 
In order to prevent such practices, ISPs need to perform Deep Packet Inspections (DPI).
88
 
This practice is in itself contrary to the end-to-end perception of internet traffic, as it requires 
ISPs to abandon their position as a mere “data pipe” in order to actively discriminate against 
different kinds of content.
89
 However, as both scholars and ISPs recognise ensuring the 
stability of the internet without these tools would probably be not possible.
90
 
Yet, the role of ISPs is not only limited to guaranteeing safety on the net. Another argument 
put forward with fervour by ISPs relates to technological progress and the need of regulation 
                                                          
78
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to respect the principle of technological neutrality.
91
 According to them, regulators should 
keep in mind that adopting net neutrality principles may seriously damage, or even completely 
block, the development of technologies that are highly demanded in the present market such 
as remote medical supervision
92
. A recurrent argument relates to the development of 
telemedicine and the improvement of VoIP (Voice over IP) services, which are bandwidth 
intensive technologies in which the stability and speed of the connection clearly determine the 
utility of the service and, with it, the willingness of users to pay for them
93
. According to ISPs, 
should net neutrality principles be enforced, these technologies could not be developed with 
enough guarantees under the current technology
 94
. 
Additionally, net neutrality opponents defend that there are enough reasons to disregard the–
sometimes desperate- pleas of net neutrality partisans for specific regulation. According to 
them, a framework with minimum regulatory intervention, acting in concurrence with 
competition law, should be enough to deal with any possible abuse.
95
 This limitation of ex 
ante regulation is deemed positive by ISPs as it interferes less with technological 
development and the natural evolution of the markets
96
. Equally, they maintain that this kind 
of regulation is unnecessary as ex post competition law is enough to constrain any harm to 
competition or consumers
97
. In any case -and unsurprisingly- the preference between net 
neutrality opponents for a semi self-regulatory model with post infringement enforcement by 
the competent authorities is very clear.
98
 
3.3 Economics of net neutrality 
3.3.1 Potential efficiencies of a discriminatory environment 
The launch by the European Commission of its “Telecommunications Single Market” 
Regulation seemed to signal the end of the previously timid and limited ex ante regulatory 
approach.
99
 As it has been argued, this approach- although with some exceptions
100
- was a 
product of the particularities and deep economic implications of this specific market
101
 and 
probably one of the main reasons the constant resolutions calling for net neutrality by the 
European Parliament –three in only four years- had been previously ignored.
102
  
The main economic argument underlying net neutrality regulation has been bluntly presented 
in several occasions by César Alierta, CEO of Telefónica
103
. Essentially, the argument is that 
infrastructure providers need to make enormous investments in order to be able to deliver 
appropriate bandwidth to the maximum number of users and to keep up with increasing 
demand while content providers “piggyback” on their efforts in order to reap huge profits.
104
 
According to this idea, OSPs should help with the effort, even if this means that their profits 
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should be lower. This argument has been subsequently repeated by ETNO, the European 
Telecommunications Network Organization, through its spokesperson Luigi Gambardella.
105
 
The case for price discrimination directly derives from the Alierta/ETNO argument. If users of 
the network (OSPs) need to participate economically in the expansion of the networks, one of 
the easiest ways to collect these funds is by charging their use of the net.
106
 What is more, by 
charging also the service provider, ISPs effectively turn the market into a two sided market 
with two different pricing strategies, since they also charge end users an “access fee”.
107
  
The implications of this dual pricing scheme will have extremely important consequences on 
the strategies adopted by ISPs to maximize their benefits.
108
 ISPs are well aware of the 
sensitives of the content provided by OSPs and their willingness to pay in order to avoid 
congestion.
109
. Some applications, such as email services, are very insensitive to sporadic 
interruptions or delays. On the contrary, services such as video streaming or VoIP can be 
rendered useless if there are delays or packet losses caused by congestion in the network.
110
 
These different requirements mean that different OSPs will have different incentives to 
interact with ISPs and, potentially, to accept a change in the way the current system works.
111
  
Unluckily, most economic models are not able to distinguish the different motivations of OSPs 
and prefer to model their behaviour homogeneously.
 112
  Equally, most models are analysed 
according to a monopoly perspective, stressing the “bottleneck role” of ISPs between both 
sides of the “data pipe”.
113
 Despite their limitations, these models underline several dilemmas 
faced by ISPs that are not easy to realise from a purely legal perspective. 
One of them, and perhaps the most surprising from a competition law perspective, is that the 
incentives of each group of actors are not as clear-cut as their initial positions
114
 would lead 
us to believe.
115
 On the contrary, some studies suggest that end-users could benefit from 
discriminatory policies as prices for accessing the network could fall.
116
 The fact that content 
providers would participate in a more active way in the development of the lower tiers of the 
network would diminish the pricing pressure on the “end” side of the pipe and, if there is a 
competitive environment for this market, prices could fall significantly.
117
 Nonetheless, this 
conclusion needs to be taken with caution, as it largely depends on the set of assumptions of 
the model used and it has been nuanced by other authors.
118
  
Unsurprisingly, most models predict that ISPs’ welfare is likely to increase under a 
discriminatory environment and that content providers would be the main losers in such a 
scenario.
119
  As a result of this, if the additional costs are properly allocated between the 
correct service providers, a discriminatory environment could have a positive impact on social 
welfare in the short term.
120
 What it is more, some studies have found that if freedom to 
choose between different qualities of network is considered as a valuable element for content 
providers and end-users, then pro-net neutrality policies are likely to have a negative effect on 
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society.
121
 
Another interesting aspect highlighted by the literature is found in the strategic pricing 
dilemma that ISPs face. On the one hand, ISPs are willing to expand the capacity of their 
networks as bigger capacity allows them to offer better service (in terms of speed, data, etc.) 
to more end-users. Logically, a better service is valued higher by consumers, who will be 
logically willing to pay more.
122
 On the other hand, the increased capability of the net will 
negatively affect the sale price of “priority rights” to content providers. As a result of the 
increased capacity, congestion will disappear and the price that content providers pay for 
priority rights will drop until the increasing demand saturates the net again. As it can be seen, 
this dynamic introduces two important opposing forces in the pricing strategy of ISPs and 
results in weaker investment incentives under a discriminatory framework.
123
  
Under a discriminatory network, the models also identify that the possibility to charge higher 
priority rights to content providers can give strong incentives to ISPs to incur more severe 
quality degradation. Among other factors, this incentive depends greatly on the proportion of 
quality-sensitive content providers.
124
 However, the threat of quality degradation disappears 
under net neutrality regulation because it would merely result in a loss of end users.
 125
 
Although the literature has expressed important concerns over the hazards of market 
integration strategies by ISPs
126
, the common assumption that market structure for ISPs is 
shaped as a monopoly limits the scope of the analysis in a substantial part of the literature, 
particularly relating to horizontal infringements.
127
 Some authors have highlighted the high 
market shares-and tied to it, high market power- and extremely strong incentives for bundling 
strategies as the main source of concern from a competition law perspective.
128
 Alternatively, 
other scholars have preferred to focus their analysis on the interplay between vertical 
integration and exclusionary strategies
129
 for competing services
130
. On the other side of the 
debate, models based on the role of congestion and rent extraction from content providers 
find that vertical integration should not give rise to regulatory concerns since, under their set 
of assumptions, there would no incentive to incur anticompetitive practices
131
 and vertical 
integration could lead to important efficiencies
132
 . Considering the mixed results, the net 
effect of such behaviour is still difficult to ascertain. 
3.3.2 Net neutrality proponent’s response 
In general, net neutrality proponents are less focused on the market impact of regulation and 
take a more defensive approach, often complementing their “simpler” market analysis with 
political and civil rights issues.
133
 However some important economic reasons to rely on net 
neutrality have been emphasised during the last years.   
Net neutrality proponents have been quick to undermine the importance of the Alierta/ETNO 
argument by pointing out that OSPs also have to face important costs relating to the 
development of the infrastructure, particularly at the stage of backbone communications.
134
 
Accusations of “free-riding” or “piggy-backing” are dismissed by net neutrality proponents on 
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the basis that network operators only cover the final stages of the total covered distance.
135
 
Another argument commonly put forward relates to the low costs of traffic management –that 
is, the cost that can be attributed to avoiding congestion from the OSPs services- and their 
negligible impact when compared with the total costs of developing a network. As the 
following figure shows, traffic management costs amount to approximately 0.66% of the total 
monthly cost per consumer, or, expressed in different words, to only 10 cents of a total cost of 
15.1 € per month. According to net neutrality proponents, the important difference in 
magnitude between these numbers does not support the demand of ISPs to receive 
additional payments to compensate the costs caused by incurring traffic management 
activities.
136
 
  Table 3: Estimated cost spread of a consumer ADSL 
 
Source: ARCEP
137
, FELTEN
138
 
Net neutrality proponents have also expressed their concerns over some aspects of market 
integration and investment incentives. In the eyes of ISPs, forbidding price discrimination 
equals to price regulation.
139
 On the other hand, net neutrality partisans argue that this 
measure is necessary due to the lack of effective competition.
140
 This absence of effective 
competition between different ISPs erodes competitive pressures in the market and favours 
positions of excessive market power, which in turn can generate exploitative 
abuses.
141
Although pro-net neutrality scholars are aware that price control can have negative 
effects on the investment incentives of ISPs
142
, they also highlight that this detrimental effect 
is also found under price discrimination strategies due to the conflicting incentives created 
between increasing net capacity for end-users and its diminishing effect on the rents charged 
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to content providers for their priority rights.
143
 
In an extremely interesting turn, net neutrality proponents have on some occasions shifted the 
attention to the perverse incentives created by deficient government regulation on the 
deployment of broadband infrastructure. According to this approach, the restrictive regulation 
imposed by governments creates an entry barrier for new ISPs and protects the incumbent’s 
market power position,
144
 thus resulting in a severe lack of competition at the end-user 
level.
145
 Accordingly, reducing regulatory barriers would allow the entrance of new market 
players, whose competitive pressure would erode the incentives for unnecessary anti-
competitive behaviour (such as service degradation) and would incentivise capacity 
investment.
146
 
Once again, content providers and end-consumer interests’ seem to be aligned. The recent 
development of Google Fiber –Google’s own experimental broadband infrastructure- in some 
regions of the U.S. has provided a clear case to evaluate the effect of the entry of new 
competitors in the net operators’ market. The local governments of Kansas City and Austin -
probably influenced by the huge media impact of Google’s new project- substantially lowered 
their requirements for “right of way”, granting access to Google Fiber for very little cost. The 
entrance of a new operator resulted in higher competition between ISPs and lower prices for 
all internet connections.
147
 Given the positive results in the selected regions, the plea for 
higher competition between ISPs and more transparent regulation on the side of governments 
has been reinforced by net neutrality partisans
148
. 
3.4 Regulatory approaches to Net Neutrality 
The debate about net neutrality was first sparked by technological change in the technical 
capabilities of ISPs to control and discriminate between the data that flowed through the 
infrastructure.
149
 By leaving behind the “application blind” original design of the internet, the 
whole design of the principles that should guide internet infrastructure was suddenly open to 
debate
150
. Although the possibility to discriminate between different content was seen with 
scepticism from the beginning, scholars and regulators were also quick to realise that content 
discrimination could be an essential tool to deal with the ever-increasing demand of end-
consumers. The importance of both sides of the debate was already highlighted by the 
creator of the term “net neutrality”
151
. However, as the need for regulation became more and 
more evident, the debate polarised quickly.
152
    
In order to tackle demands for regulatory intervention,
153
 governments and regulatory 
agencies have tried different regulatory frameworks. Using previous experiences, at least 
three different approaches can be identified:  use of legislation, actions through regulation and 
intervention by means of soft-law elements. These different strategies differ in the goals they 
want to secure and these experiences are worth analysing in order to draw conclusions about 
the most desirable framework for regulation in a field as sensitive as net neutrality. 
LEGISLATION: Hard law was the preferred choice of many of the jurisdictions that pioneered 
net neutrality regulation. Legislation has commonly been the choice in those countries in 
which abuses by ISPs were perceived as a direct threat to fundamental liberties, thus causing 
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a higher concern to society and a more important impact in the political debate.
154
 
This approach has proven particularly popular in South America, where Brazil
155
, Colombia
156
, 
Chile
157
, Peru
158
 and Mexico
159
 have updated their telecommunications law in order to tackle 
concerns over net neutrality. In Europe, this strategy was chosen by the Netherlands
160
 and 
Slovenia
161
 -the two pioneers of net neutrality regulation in Europe 
162
 and, more recently has 
been adopted by the European Union through Regulation 2015/2120.
163
  
The benefits of introducing legislation through hard norms have been widely studied. First and 
foremost, legislation gives legal certainty and ensures a stable framework in which the 
different actors of the market can act.
164
 This is particularly important in sectors, such as 
broadband development, in which investments in infrastructure account for the bulk of the 
costs and the recovery of the expense is planned over long periods of time.
165
 Legislation also 
has the benefit of higher legitimacy, due to the democratic process in which it is drafted and 
which usually implies the use of public enquiries and consultation of the different stakeholders 
in the market.
166
 In addition, and opposed to norms issued by regulatory bodies, legislation 
can only be challenged under very special circumstances,
167
 thus ensuring the stability and 
durability of the system.     
 Experience shows that most legislative approaches take an extremely favourable position 
towards net neutrality.
168
 In some cases, such strategies have been criticised for neglecting 
the valid concerns raised by net neutrality opponents.
169
 Traditionally national parliaments 
have adopted extremely hard rules banning quality of service, zero rating and tackling any 
foreclosure threats, with only very limited exceptions in order to guarantee the stability of the 
net under special circumstances (e.g. criminal enforcement, suppression of spam or 
management under exceptional demand). In some cases, national legislation even foresees 
notification systems for users that may be problematic in terms of congestion issues before 
proper action is taken.
170
 
REGULATION: Depending of the conferred competences, regulatory bodies can on some 
occasions issue their own rules on matters such as net neutrality. Some countries have 
preferred this approach to issuing “hard” laws. The two most relevant examples are 
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Canada
171
 and the U.S.
 172
 
In many ways, the choice between regulation and “hard” law reflects a choice between 
democratic legitimacy and technical knowledge
173
. Although this division needs to be nuanced 
(parliaments can be assisted by experts and regulators can improve the democratic 
legitimacy of their actions by consultations)
 174
 the strategy choice has very important 
consequences in the regulatory framework. As the experience in different countries has 
shown, pure regulatory approaches are usually less influenced by the debate on civil rights on 
the net and, consequently, are more likely to take into account the economics and context of 
the market.
175
 As a result, regulatory intervention can be more balanced than in cases of 
direct parliamentary intervention.
176
 
However, regulatory intervention can also be a risky choice. Under most jurisdictions, actions 
by regulatory agencies can be reviewed and challenged in courts. Ultimately, these 
challenges can strike down the whole legislation, thus introducing important elements of 
uncertainty and instability in the regulatory framework.
177
 The clearest example of these risks 
is found in the recent developments in the U.S, as Verizon was able to challenge the authority 
of the FCC (Federal Communications Commission) and strike down the Open Internet 
Order
178
, which imposed principles of non-discrimination and no blocking on ISPs.
179
 In this 
case in particular, the Court of Appeals of Washington D.C
180
. found that the FCC was 
competent to issue norms in elements such as net neutrality, but it found that the obligations 
included in those principles contravened the ban on imposing common carrier obligations to 
undertakings that had not been categorised by the FCC as telecommunication service 
providers, as was the case for ISPs.
181
  The important repercussions of an annulment such as 
the one at hand clearly show the significant risks of regulatory intervention by agencies, and 
how the in-depth and complex analysis carried out by Courts will magnify this risk when 
broader policy issues are at stake. 
SOFT LAW: Soft law approaches are characterised by the use of co-regulation, conduct codes, 
guidelines and other different strategies to involve stakeholders in the process. This approach 
has been particularly popular in Asia and some of the most relevant jurisdictions in Europe 
(including France, the U.K. and the Scandinavian countries). 
Soft regulation can take several forms. In the case of France, the regulator was              
sceptical about the role of net neutrality and the weight of American companies in the design 
of network principles.
 182
 As a result ARCEP (Autorité de Régulation des Communications 
Electroniques et des Postes) published a set of principles oriented to regulate elements such 
as consumer rights, capacity, congestion management or transparency for all actors in the 
market without having to adopt a whole set of net neutrality rules.
183
 In a similar fashion, 
Norway holds annual stakeholder meetings to discuss the status of net neutrality in the 
country.
184
 By trying to find compromises between the different sides of the market, the 
                                                          
171
 Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC, 2009-657. Ottawa, CA: Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission, October 21, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2009/2009-657.htm. Accessed on 22/04/2016 
172
 FCC. Report and Order on Remand, Declaratory Ruling, and Order, March 12, 2015,  FCC 15-24. 
Avaliable at https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-15-24A1.pdf. Accessed on 22/04/2016  
173
 R. LAYTON, supra note 11, p.159 
174
 F. SORENSEN, supra note 162, p.233 
175
 R. LAYTON, supra note 11, p.159 
176
 K. STYLIANOU, supra note 40, p.214 
177
 R. LAYTON, supra note 11, p.159 
178
 FCC, Report and Order , December 23, 2010, FCC 10-201. Available at 
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-10-201A1_Rcd.pdf. Accessed on 22/04/2016 
179
 B. VAN SCHEWICK. Supra note 5 , p.2 
180
 Verizon Communications Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
181
 B. VAN SCHEWICK. Supra note 5 , p.2 
182
 R. LAYTON, supra note 11, p.161 
183
 ARCEP, “Neutralite de l’internet: Etat des Lieux du Cade de Régulation”. Les Actes de l’Arcep. 
September 2015.p7-14 
184
 F. SORENSEN, supra note 26, p.233 
 20 
 
Norwegian regulator hopes to dilute the need for hard-core regulation
185
. 
In many ways, soft-law, acting along with competition rules, has the power to overcome the 
defects of legislation and regulation by specialised authorities.
186
 Under a soft-law structure, 
regulators are relieved of the pressure of having to find the correct approach the first time as 
the system allows for higher flexibility.
 187
  Additionally, the risk of litigation to challenge 
regulatory measures is substantially lower. This can lead to the initially counter-intuitive result 
that soft-law can give greater legal certainty than norms issued by the a priori competent 
authority and subsequently challenged in court.      
Soft law has also kept a good record on legitimacy issues. Net neutrality advocates and 
opponents can agree on common points and discard the back-or-white approach that has 
been widely criticised in legislation while designing a framework that will prevent -or punish- 
any possible abuse.
188
 As some authors suggest, name and shame strategies in a sector as 
relevant to public opinion as net neutrality could be a more effective restraining method than 
hard rules that can be easily defeated in court.
189
 In addition, the enforcement capacity of soft 
law rules can be complemented by a “carrot and stick” strategy: ISPs have an incentive to 
respect soft-rules (carrot) to avoid greater rulemaking by governments (stick).  
In light of these elements, it is not surprising that many authors have expressed their 
preferences for a soft-law approach instead of intervention by Parliaments or rulemaking 
agencies.
190
 In their view, applying a more flexible set of principles along with a case-to-case 
enforcement through competition law would allow to break the lock created by the two 
opposing positions.
191
 By filtering only those practices that have been proved to be harmful to 
society, the regulatory framework ensures that no additional distortions are introduced in 
adjacent matters-such as investment or consumer protection.
192
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4 Lights and shades of Regulation 2015/2120. 
After having analysed the different approaches to regulation of net neutrality, this section will 
evaluate the provisions of Regulation 2015/2120. This examination will be complemented by 
the most common critiques to this piece of legislation and, to conclude, the arguments for and 
against an alternative regulatory framework will be analysed in light of the previous sections.  
4.1 Key elements of Regulation 2015/2120 
On 27 October 2015 the European Parliament adopted the Telecoms Single Market (TSM) 
Regulation.
193
 This regulation is the product of a long debate in the EU institutions, which in 
many ways mimicked the debate that took place in societies on both sides of the Atlantic 
during the previous years.
194
 Already in 2009 the European Commission issued a declaration 
that expressed its commitment to preserve the open structure and neutrality of the internet. 
This advance resulted in Directive 2009/140/EC
195
 whose objective was to prevent divergent 
approaches by different national regulators, to empower them to sanction violations of 
reasonable traffic-management practices and to protect sensitive areas relating to competition 
within the internal market and consumer rights
196
. 
However, after the European Parliament issued four requirements demanding stronger 
action
197
 on the field of net neutrality, the Commission finally presented a new proposal in 
September 2013. The goal of this proposal, as part of the Digital Agenda strategy,
198
 was 
again to ensure a smooth internal telecommunications market by introducing several net 
neutrality provisions that would guarantee a model of open internet.
199
 After a long negotiation 
progress, the Regulation was formally approved on 1 October 2015 by the Council and 27 
October 2015 by the European Parliament
200
 
This new set of rules, that will be applicable from 30 April 2016, introduces new elements in 
four different areas: end user’s rights, non-discrimination obligations for ISPs, rules for 
specialised services, and rules on zero ratings and data caps. 
End User’s rights to open internet access 
The new regulation, as the overwhelming majority of legislative instruments all around the 
world,
201
 takes a clear position in favour of net neutrality. As such, the Regulation bans any 
kind of blocking, throttling or discrimination by ISPs in the services they provide to end 
users.
202
  
Surprisingly, the regulation does not provide a definition of the term “net neutrality”.
203
 This 
ambiguity is the result of a long debate between the European Parliament and the Council 
about the reach of the term. While the European Parliament favoured a broader definition for 
the concept, the Council wanted to restrict net neutrality to the equal treatment of internet 
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traffic.
204
 Finally, an agreement was reached between both institutions to guarantee equal 
treatment and free access for end users- independently of the application or technical 
equipment used- but this compromise was reached at the cost of not including a clear 
definition of the term.
205
 
ISP non-discrimination obligation 
By extension of the definition of net neutrality, the non-discrimination requirements in 
Regulation 2015/2120 ban the adoption of QoS strategies by ISPs and enshrine the use of 
the best effort principle as the basis of network management, regardless of whether the 
company has a dominant position in the market.
206
 Only under very special circumstances 
does the Regulation allow to set aside the equal treatment of data packets.
207
 These 
circumstances -labelled as “reasonable traffic management measures”
208
- aim to guarantee 
the stability and safety of the network. These practices, based on merely technical aspects, 
are subject to a proportionality test carried out by national regulators.
209
 However, no further 
information is given about the requirements of this test which, historically, has resulted in 
some confusion about its limits and application in cases of abuse of dominant position.
210
 
Additional exceptions are foreseen to allow ISPs to comply with legislative acts, orders by 
courts or public authorities, to prevent damage to the network or to ensure the security of 
those using it.
211
   
Specialised Services 
During the negotiations, net neutrality opponents raised the possibility that some sectors that 
require a particularly demanding quality of connection (i.e. telemedicine or some VoIP 
services) could be labelled as “special services” and be excluded from the common net 
neutrality requirements.
212
 This effectively meant that ISPs would exempt a part of their 
network from network neutrality rules and devote it to these particular activities. 
Once again the European Parliament and the Commission collided in their views on the 
matter.
213
 Finally, the possibility of offering “specialised services” is guaranteed if the service 
provided is clearly differentiated to those given over the traditional network
214
 and there is no 
detriment to the “best effort” service on the rest of the network. These safeguards want to 
ensure that ISPs will not use the “specialised service” category to circumvent the obligations 
imposed on the traditional network.  
To ensure this differentiation, a substitution test is designed to ensure that the service cannot 
be simply delivered over the traditional network. As it was the case for the non-discrimination 
principle, the test is barely developed in the Regulation and national regulators need clearer 
rules to carry out their analysis.
215
  
                                                          
204
 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 196. p. 3 
205
 In its Article 1, Regulation 2015/2120 refers to its goal as “the safeguard of equal and non-
discriminatory treatment of traffic internet (…) related end-users’ rights” 
206
 J. MCNAMEE, M, FERNÁNDEZ PÉREZ, supra note  99, p.188 
207
 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 196. p. 3 
208
 Regulation 2015/2120, supra  note 1, Article 3.3  
209
 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 196. p. 3 
210
 D. WOOD, “Proving It: The standard and burden of proof in article 82 cases” [2008] Competition Law 
Insight, p.2  
211
 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 196. p. 4 
212
 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 196. p. 4 
213
 J. MCNAMEE, M, FERNÁNDEZ PÉREZ, supra note  99, p.188 
214
 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, supra note 196. p. 4 
215
 J. MARCUS, M. WALDBURGER, “Identifying harm to the best efforts internet” [2015] Wissenschaftliches   
Institut für Infrastruktur und Kommunikationsdienste, p.23 
 23 
 
Zero rating and data caps 
The term “data caps” refers to a limit in the amount of data a consumer can use in a certain 
period of time. If the limit is exceeded, the end users may experience slower connection 
speed, extra fees or even prevention from further use.
216
 
Regulation 2015/2010 takes a liberal approach to these contracts and acknowledges their 
importance for the business model of most ISPs. As a result of this, ISPs are able to include 
in their contracts with end-users element such as speed, prices or volume of data.
217
 This 
element, as well as the possibility of applying higher fees once the limit is exceeded, have not 
raised important questions from a net neutrality perspective.
218
 
On the other hand, “zero rating” strategies have sparked a more interesting debate. Zero 
rating is defined as a positive price discrimination practice that allows users to access 
applications, services or content without being charged or without the data consumed in that 
action being considered for contractual purposes.
219
 In essence it means that access to some 
applications or content is given for free. Although this is undoubtedly positive for end users, it 
raises important concerns from a competition law perspective as it allows ISPs to favour their 
affiliated content against rival services.
220
  
Despite these concerns, Regulation 2015/2120 does not forbid the use of zero rating by ISPs. 
Disappointed by the decision, some scholars and national regulators have concluded that this 
practice can be abusive and have expressed their opinion that it should be banned.
221
 On the 
other side of the debate, proponents of zero rating strategies argue that this is a legitimate 
action to promote specific content and applications and deem that the impact on competition, 
investment and social welfare is unequivocally positive.
222
 However, the text of the regulation 
does not provide any tool to help national regulators distinguish between anti-competitive and 
welfare enhancing
223
 practices in their jurisdiction, thus increasing the legal uncertainty on the 
matter.
224
 
4.2 Critiques to Regulation 2015/2120 
Although most stakeholders have expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the 
negotiations and the text of the Regulation,
225
 this satisfaction seems to relate more to 
damage limitation strategies and political gratification than delight with the legal and economic 
outcome of the text of the Regulation. Net neutrality proponents congratulate themselves 
because they now have a piece of legislation that explictly enshrines most of the principles 
they endorse.
226
 On the other side of the debate the mood is also relatively cheerful. Although 
most of the provisions are detrimental to the interests of ISPs, they have been able to keep 
enough backdoors open to ensure that some of their most fundamental demands are not 
automatically discarded. Even if the most grievous discriminatory practices have been 
banned
227
  (thus appeasing the European Parliament and voters in many Member State 
jurisdictions) ISPs are still able to implement some discriminatory practices via the so called 
“specialised services”, “zero rating” strategies or even through the use of traffic management 
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actions foreseen for “exceptional circumstances”.
 228
   
However, by trying to find a compromise between both sides of the net neutrality debate, the 
Regulation may have missed its main objective: providing a stable regulatory framework that 
guarantees end users’rights and fair competition in the market. While it is true that Regulation 
2015/2120 avoids the common black-or-white approach that has been heavily criticised in 
previous net neutrality regulation,
229
 it is also true that it offers extremely little guidance on 
how to deal with situations that fall out of the scope of the most grievous abuses. 
   In many ways, the Regulation is far from being a solid piece of legislation. For instance, Art 
3.3.a recognises that “courts or public authorities vested with relevant powers”
230
 will be able 
to block or slow down sites. Nonetheless, recital 13 of the Regulation recognises that the text 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
231
 is applicable to any restrictions applied by traffic 
providers. These two elements are hard to reconcile, since the Charter recognises that any 
limitations in the exercise of fundamental rights (such as the rights of expression or 
information) must always be provided by law.
232
 As a result, the role that national regulatory 
bodies can play in some of their decisions to guarantee the stability and security of the net is 
somehow unclear and still open to debate.
 233
  
 Equally, the Regulation allows ISPs to apply reasonable, technical
234
 measures to manage 
the network
235
. Unluckily, the text of the Regulation does not offer any information about the 
technical parameters that ISPs can use to manipulate traffic in their networks and it only 
states that these measures must be transparent, non-discriminatory and subject to a test of 
proportionality. As highlighted by some authors, this framework can be very detrimental to 
minority protocols (such as encrypted communications) or those whose requirements from the 
net are uncommon (such as FTP or P2P), thus creating the possibility for distortions to 
competition.
236
 
Regulation 2015/2120 does not offer a clearer solution for cases of zero rating. Although, due 
to its “positive” nature, zero rating practices have sparked less outrage than other price 
discriminations, the Parliament and the Council have struggled to find a compromise on this 
matter. Both the European Parliament’s Rapporteur and Commissioner Oettinger stated in the 
first reading of the legislation that zero rating practices would fall out of the scope of the 
regulation.
237
 This would have led to conflicts with jurisdictions (such as the Netherlands) that 
had already banned the practice.
238
 However, the final text Regulation decided to allow this 
kind of practices, therefore introducing an important source for distortions of competition.
239
     
In conclusion, Regulation 2015/2120 seems to offer a poor balance on the two strongest 
points of hard legislation: legal certainty and democratic legitimacy.
 240 
Without clear rules –or 
even guidelines- to analyse the proportionality of exceptions to the non-discrimination 
principle or the substitutability of the specialised services,
 241
 national regulators will find 
themselves ill equipped to apply the principles of the Regulation. 
242
   
  . 
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4.3 Improvements to Regulation 2015/2120 
Under most circumstances, clear-cut legislation is considered desirable in markets where 
investment plays an important role.
243
 However, there are major concerns on whether the 
approach taken by Regulation 2015/2120 is able to have a positive impact on society apart 
from its provisions protecting civil rights.
244
 Some authors have even expressed that it would 
not be surprising to find that, under the current circumstances, ISPs will reduce their 
investment in infrastructure or that end users will have to bear the burden of further 
investment to keep up to the increasing demand.
245
 
Among the proposals to improve the content of the legislative act, a call for co-regulation and 
case-per-case analysis of infringements with the assistance of competition law seems to be 
particularly popular between specialised scholars, particularly among those who frame net 
neutrality in more economic terms.
246
 In reality, this approach does not differ in many points 
from the proposals of Regulation 2015/2120 in matters of civil rights, but it would offer a more 
consistent approach in economic and competition terms. By drawing the regulation at the 
European level closer to the Scandinavian model 
247
 the EU could overcome the lock on the 
debate on net neutrality while addressing issues that are specific to the European Market.
248
 
In particular, the use of the U.S. regulation on the matter as a model has been heavily 
criticised due to important differences in the underlying regulation for telecommunication 
markets (for instance on common carrier obligations)
249
 , the role of content providers
250
 and 
ISPs and the role of sector specific regulation and competition law.
251
 
The deep implications of these three elements underline the complexity of the market, 
particularly when its impact on adjacent fields (such as innovation) is taken into account. 
Adopting “hard” net neutrality principles may even favour the big companies that already 
dominate the market disproportionately, as small, innovative start-ups could try to overcome 
their lack of network effects by paying ISPs for a better and faster service to end-
consumers.
252
 As a result, banning any kind of differentiation on the market could have the 
undesired effect of securing the incumbent’s dominant positions. 
The complexity of the market is also clearly visible at the pace it develops and changes. 
Some internet giants are already developing their own data centres and networks in order to 
provide higher quality video streaming or cloud services to end users. If the trend continues, 
the structure of internet traffic will move away from the “end-to-end” data pipe concept to a 
more modular structure.
253
 Under this structure, exclusionary abuses from vertically integrated 
operators would not be a major concern, while active differentiation in pricing and services 
would.
254
  
However, a co-regulatory approach needs important improvements in certain areas in order to 
ensure the necessary guarantees. One of the fields that has traditionally been pointed as a 
weakness of the European system is its lack of transparency, both in the contracts between 
end-users and ISPs and in traffic management activities. Excessively high entry barriers and 
exorbitant administrative burdens for new ISPs have also been signalled as a cause of low 
competitive pressure between network operators and a relatively low-hanging fruit for 
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improvement.
255
 
The third element, and perhaps the most relevant in order to ensure a good functioning of the 
market, relates to the role of competition law as an effective tool to ensure a fair competitive 
environment. This point has sparked debates for a long time with very different positions and 
it is worth a brief analysis.
 256
  
4.4 The (uncomplete) role of competition law 
By merely relying on guidelines and other soft law instruments to set the general direction of 
net neutrality, competition law would play a crucial role to discipline the market and define the 
extent of anti-competitive practices.
257
 However, this approach seems to conflict with one of 
the most actives debates on EU competition law, as it would require a strong effect-based 
approach to abuses of Art. 102 TFEU.  
According to some authors, applying an economic-based approach to the enforcement of net 
neutrality principles should not cause any problem.
 258
 On the contrary, they contend that an 
approach based on a “rule of reason” test would be able to discriminate between harmful and 
beneficial practices and benefit society without need for further specific regulation.
259
 This 
model was advocated-and almost adopted- by the FCC in 2014 with its “Notice for Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) in the Matter of Protecting and Promoting the Open internet”.
260
As 
expressed by the text of the proposal, restrictions of competition would be banned, “based on 
the totality of the circumstances
261
, threaten to harm internet openness and all that it 
protects”.
262
  
However, a comparable approach could be difficult to replicate in the EU, particularly taking 
into account the greater reticence of the ECJ to abandon its per se approach to infringements 
of Art 102 TFEU for a more economic based reasoning.
263
  
While it remains undisputed that ISPs have a position of “gate-keepers” due to the necessity 
of content providers to connect with them,
 264 
 it is not so clear whether that market power 
translates into a higher control of refusal to deal with infringements by competition authorities, 
as the satisfaction of the criteria
265
 set in Bronner
266
 and Microsoft
267
 is far from clear, 
particularly regarding indispensability.
 268
 However, the text of the Guidance Paper
269
 or the 
presence of certain circumstances -such as the existence of previous dealings- could lower 
the need to satisfy these criteria and favour a proper assessment of these infringements.
270
  
For cases where there is no blocking of the content but degradation in the quality or speed of 
the service, the current approach under 102 TFEU could also raise some questions about its 
applicability to net neutrality abuses. An important question concerns the coherence of how 
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blocking access to the net and discriminatory practices are dealt with. As explained in Telia 
Sonera
271
, supply under disadvantageous terms does not need to satisfy the conditions laid 
down in Bronner as there is no refusal to supply.
272
  However, this could lead to the 
contradiction that the most grievous infringement (refusal to supply) could be subject to 
stricter requirements to find an abuse under 102 TFEU than less harmful conducts 
(unfavourable discriminatory conditions).
273
  
Additionally, the current scope of Art.102 would not be able to deal with some discriminatory 
situations likely to arise without “hard” net neutrality regulation. This is the case, for instance, 
for discriminatory practices directed towards applications or data packets, which would fall 
outside the current scope of Art. 102 TFEU as they do not translate in discrimination between 
firms.
274
 
But, besides these incoherencies, the reluctant response of the ECJ to a more economic 
driven approach to abuses of dominant positions seems to be the most important obstacle to 
a hypothetical reconciliation of competition law with a more flexible approach to net neutrality. 
Although the Commission has shown its willingness to take a less formalistic approach to 
abuses of dominant position, -for instance with its Guidance paper, or the reasoning in Intel
275
 
or the Post Danmark
276
 cases- the GC and the ECJ have wandered over the role of economic 
analysis or the role of per se abuses under the text of 102 TFEU
277
. In order to ensure the 
proper functioning of the market and the coherence with flexible regulatory principles, the ECJ 
needs to sacrifice the legal certainty and enforcement efficiencies provided by formalistic 
approach of the cases such as Michelin
278
, British Airways
279
 or, more recently the Intel case, 
and to decisively adopt a more economic approach when dealing with these infringements.  
In this sense, the wider understanding of Art 102.c TFEU in Post Danmark I regarding the 
possibility of offering different conditions to similar clients without being considered as an 
abuse –as long as prices did not reach a predatory level
280
- offers a good insight of the kind of 
effect-based approach demanded by a more flexible regulatory framework for net neutrality. 
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5 Conclusions: 
Several serious infringements to freedom of expression and information carried out by ISPs in 
the U.S and the European Union sparked the interest of many sectors of society on the 
debate about net neutrality. The need to prevent an 1984-esque future in which ISPs have 
absolute control over the information that is accessible to end-users has featured prominently 
in many political debates of western societies during the last decade, and has inspired several 
governments to take decisive action against such threat. 
However, a closer analysis of the elements at stake reveals a more complex-although 
perhaps less romantic- reality. As many other regulatory debates, the debate over net 
neutrality personifies the economic interest of the different actors of the market. Technological 
change now allows ISPs to move from the “application blind” model of the net to a less 
application agnostic business model. As a result of this, ISPs can now discriminate between 
the different data that flows to their network and use this ability to tap into new sources of 
revenue. On the other side of the debate, content providers fear having to pay important sums 
to ISPs in order to reach their main source of income: end-consumers.  
These purely technical concerns are reinforced by economic elements. ISPs argue that, 
without costly investments, they will not be able to satisfy the increasing demand and 
congestion will become endemic in the network. Fearing having to contribute financially to 
these investments, most content providers have allied themselves with sectors of civil society 
in order to maintain open access to the internet and preserve the democratic principles of its 
original design (while saving substantial amounts of money). 
Although exaggerated, almost apocalyptical visions are commonly used on both sides of the 
debate to tilt the opinion of civil society and regulators; the truth is that net neutrality 
addresses important elements of sustainability and security of the network and consumer 
rights. In the case of the European Union, these concerns have been addressed in the 
framework of the Digital Market Strategy by the means of Regulation 2015/2120.   
Regulation 2015/2120 is, without doubt, an important step forward in the regulation of net 
neutrality. After long years of debate and negotiation, the Council and European Parliament 
have been able to pass a piece of legislation that most stakeholders consider as acceptable. 
However, this satisfaction does not necessarily relate to the quality of the text. While the 
Regulation devotes lots of resources to guaranteeing the rights of end-users, important issues 
related to the economic and competitive concerns of net neutrality are neglected or very 
lightly regulated. This could have important detrimental consequences for society in the 
following years. 
One of the most important critics relates to the choice of a legislative instrument such as a 
Regulation and the ambiguity of most of its content. As a Regulation, this piece of legislation 
was expected to provide legal certainty and democratic legitimacy to the approach adopted by 
the EU. However, by deferring the assessment of the most complicating practices to national 
regulators over very vague tests, the Regulation fails both of its original purposes. 
This has led some authors to wonder if, given the difficulty to correctly address the legitimate 
concerns of both sides of the debate, a more flexible approach to net neutrality would not 
have been more desirable. From their point of view, a co-regulatory approach based on 
flexible principles and guidelines would avoid the current black-and-white approach and would 
tolerate practices that are beneficial to society while punishing those who pose a threat to fair 
competition.   
However, this flexible approach requires important changes in the way European markets 
work. First, transparency in the market and in traffic management practices needs to be 
improved. Without transparent contracts and traffic management practices, competition 
between ISPs is severely restricted. Secondly, governments need to lower the barriers of 
access to broadband services. In many areas of Europe the broadband market is very 
concentrated, and in many cases, only a couple of ISPs deliver to a particular area. In order 
to foster competition in the market switching costs have to be lowered so that the threat of 
 29 
 
“voting with your feet” can be real. 
Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, there are some concerns about the ability of current 
European competition law to deal with net neutrality related abuses in a satisfactory way. 
Although 102 TFEU has explored figures that are fully applicable to this context –such as 
refusal to deal or exploitative abuses- case law has imposed a number of tests that, in some 
cases, cannot be fully transposed to a net neutrality context. Additionally, the ECJ would have 
to follow the steps of the Commission and adopt a more effects-based approach to 102 TFEU 
infringements in order to maintain coherence with a flexible set of principles while ensuring 
discipline in the market. 
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